Capital, contrarianism, and the deep tech developmental state: Rethinking Singapore’s innovation trajectory
Deep tech won’t succeed on administrative excellence alone. Singapore needs a different playbook.
Singapore has built one of the world’s most tightly engineered innovation systems. But deep tech doesn’t reward administrative excellence alone. To compete in the next decade, the city-state will need a more contrarian, identity-driven approach to risk, capital, and regional orchestration.
By Pierrick Bouffaron
Managing Partner at Entropia Capital, where he focuses on building and backing frontier-tech ventures across the US, Europe, and Asia.
Few countries have invested as systematically in science and technology as Singapore. Over the last thirty years, the city-state has built and heavily supported an elaborate architecture of research institutes, translational centers, public–private laboratories, and state-backed venture programs. The aim has always gone beyond economic diversification. It was about positioning Singapore as a key node in the emerging knowledge economy: a place where frontier technologies are developed, commercialized, and governed—an ambition underwritten by more than SGD 60 billion in public R&D investment since 2006.
This project has yielded undeniable successes, from attracting globally respected researchers to hosting pharmaceutical manufacturing, semiconductor supply-chain nodes, and sophisticated biomedical research infrastructure. Yet the last few years—under the shadow of a global venture capital contraction—have exposed the limits of this approach. The 2024 and 2025 e-Conomy SEA reports point to a slowdown in early-stage venture formation, while PitchBook and Preqin data show multi-year declines in APAC deep-tech fundraising since 2022. In practice, most early-stage deep-tech ventures still struggle to reach meaningful commercial scale. Venture capital firms find it increasingly difficult to raise new capital without leaning heavily on government anchors. Several international players, including biotech-focused funds such as Lightstone and accelerators like Entrepreneur First, have exited Singapore, and few new deep-tech investors or company-builders have emerged in the last five years. And despite the billions invested across successive Research, Innovation and Enterprise (RIE) cycles, the conversion of research outputs into globally competitive firms remains uneven.
What happens when a developmental state attempts to engineer a deep-tech ecosystem under conditions of small-market scale, culturally embedded risk aversion, and a global investment climate that rewards contrarian boldness over administrative excellence? Deep tech, after all, cannot be steered through administrative optimization alone; it depends on contrarian judgment, tolerance for ambiguity, and strategic bets whose payoff may emerge only one or two decades later.
Singapore’s answer, I would argue, requires rethinking not only its instruments of support, but also the intellectual and cultural foundations of its innovation strategy. The country has repeatedly adapted and localized global models to its own context. Building on this tradition, Singapore could now benefit from a deeper commitment to contrarian ideas, policy experimentation, and a more distinctive “national DNA” in deep-tech development—one that does not simply import foreign playbooks, but reshapes them to the realities of a small, open, and strategically constrained economy.
The evolution of Singapore’s innovation system
Singapore’s innovation strategy is still best understood through the lens of the developmental state: long-term planning, a strong public bureaucracy, and targeted investment in priority sectors. This model has proved adaptable. The agencies that once focused on electronics, petrochemicals, and logistics now direct their efforts toward biomedical sciences, quantum technologies, advanced manufacturing, sustainable materials, and AI.
Yet this continuity obscures a significant shift. The original developmental state emerged in environments where governments could discipline domestic firms, shape capital allocation through bank-based systems, and nurture national champions in sectors with clear industrial boundaries. Deep tech does not operate under such conditions. By “deep tech,” we mean ventures grounded in scientific breakthroughs—biomedical platforms, quantum technologies, advanced materials, AI, robotics—where development is capital-intensive, slow, and dependent on specialized talent and infrastructure. Knowledge flows are global, regulatory landscapes are volatile, and competitive advantage now depends less on capex than on learning speed, network effects, scientific interpretation, and global commercial reach.
Singapore’s early deep-tech strategy—visible in the creation of Biopolis, Fusionopolis, A*STAR’s research institutes, and talent-recruitment initiatives—was analytically coherent: build research excellence first, then develop commercialization pathways on the go. Through the 2000s, the country succeeded in attracting leading scientists and building facilities that rival global innovation hubs. Yet commercialization remained modest. Much output from public research institutions translated into publications rather than venture formation, a pattern common in research-intensive systems.
The 2010s marked a shift toward entrepreneurship. A handful of startups—Structo, Horizon Quantum Computing, RWDC—demonstrated the potential for research translation and put Singapore on the deep tech map. Government-backed matching schemes and accelerators expanded the pool of founders. Corporate labs and translational units emerged in partnership with industry, creating new opportunities in medtech, advanced materials, and automation. But despite this institutional expansion, a structural bottleneck persisted: deep-tech startups struggled to scale beyond Singapore and the region, and late-stage capital remained scarce. Zimplistic, maker of the Rotimatic smart kitchen robot, is often cited as a cautionary example. Despite strong demand and more than US$50 million in funding, the company struggled with manufacturing scale, product reliability, and global distribution before ultimately being liquidated. Its trajectory illustrates Singapore’s “home-market handicap”: hardware and deep-tech companies must commercialize globally from day one, without the buffer of a large domestic market to refine manufacturing, iterate with early customers, or stabilize unit economics.
The post-2020 period has intensified the deep-tech agenda, particularly in areas aligned with geopolitical and sustainability priorities. One sees this in efforts to attract cell-therapy manufacturing, build medtech platforms, and develop quantum and photonics capabilities. Singapore has no shortage of novel technologies in the pipeline. What remains elusive is the consistent emergence of firms capable of competing globally at scale.
Structural constraints: scale, culture, and capital
These constraints run deeper than funding levels or program design.
The first is market size. Deep-tech ventures often require extensive testbeds, long regulatory pathways, supply-chain integration, and anchor customers willing to validate early proof-of-concepts. Singapore’s domestic market is too small to generate sufficient early demand for medtech diagnostics, robotics systems, or sustainable-manufacturing innovations. While government agencies sometimes act as early adopters, this cannot replicate the industrial fabric of larger economies. As a result, most successful Singapore-based deep-tech companies (e.g., BiOptic, RWDC) ultimately depended on foreign commercialization environments—an expression of the same home-market handicap noted earlier.
The second is risk culture. Singapore has invested heavily in entrepreneurial education, from university incubators to the NUS Overseas Colleges. But survey data—including the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor and studies by EDB and the Institute of Policy Studies—shows that concerns about financial risk, career disruption, and social mobility remain comparatively high. Deep tech is defined by uncertainty, long timelines, and the possibility of scientific failure. This creates a mismatch between national ambition and individual incentives. Many talented young people still gravitate toward civil service, consulting, or finance rather than high-risk research ventures. The result is a scarcity of founders willing to spend 8–10 years navigating regulation, complex science, and global market development.
The third constraint is capital structure. Seed and Series A funding are relatively well supported through state-backed co-investment schemes, angel networks, and early-stage funds. But many observers note that local deep-tech VCs are still building the capabilities required to underwrite long-cycle ventures. Others have shifted deployment abroad, attracted by denser talent pools or lower perceived risk. Very few local funds have the mandate or LP support to lead substantial Series B or C rounds; Singapore typically sees fewer than five such rounds per year, almost always led by Temasek, global corporates, or overseas investors. As a result, the availability of early institutional capital for genuinely frontier research remains thinner than headline figures suggest.
The limits of an ROI-driven approach to R&D&I
One of the least discussed but most important issues in Singapore’s innovation governance is the increasing emphasis on quantifiable returns: measurable outputs, milestone completion, near-term commercialization metrics. These tools are essential in a system where public funds must be justified. But deep tech does not conform neatly to such logic.
Research translation is inherently uncertain. Many of the breakthroughs that matter—CRISPR, mRNA therapeutics, lithium-ion batteries, photonic chips—emerged from environments that tolerated ambiguity and invested long before commercial potential crystallized. Systems that impose premature discipline risk selecting for incremental improvements rather than transformative innovation.
There is also an unintended behavioral effect. Interviews suggest that some Singapore-based founders calibrated projects around public funding schemes more than global customer needs. Compliance and milestone reporting become central activities. Internationalization is delayed until programs allow it. When public support is generous yet administratively rigid, companies can survive locally while failing to confront global markets.
This is why contrarian thinking matters. An innovation system cannot be managed purely as a portfolio of financial assets. It requires strategic bets on emerging domains that may mature only after a decade, and which conventional ROI heuristics would discourage. Without intellectual elasticity, public policy risks becoming an exercise in administrative optimization rather than a creative act of nation-building.
Toward a distinct Singaporean deep-tech identity
If Singapore’s first twenty years of innovation were defined by institution-building and the adoption of global best practices, the next twenty demand distinctiveness. The question is not simply how to attract more researchers or fund more startups, but how to craft an innovation identity aligned with Singapore’s unique strengths: geopolitical neutrality, regulatory sophistication, financial depth, and pragmatic governance.
One possibility is to position Singapore as a regional orchestrator rather than a domestic incubator. Many Southeast Asian markets possess the scale, natural resources, and industrial challenges that require deep-tech solutions—agritech in Vietnam, medtech in Indonesia, green materials in Malaysia, and sustainable manufacturing across the region. Singapore can serve as the command center for capital formation, governance, and IP protection for these technologies, even if early deployments occur abroad. Performance Rotors, a Singapore-founded robotics company conducting industrial inspection deployments across Indonesia and Malaysia while keeping its R&D, IP, and governance anchored in Singapore, exemplifies this orchestrator model.
Another avenue is deepening translational partnerships with global industry. Singapore’s strengths in biologics, semiconductors, and specialty chemicals create opportunities for commercial testbeds rather than purely experimental labs. Companies such as Illumina, GSK, and Micron show that Singapore can host sophisticated industrial activity. The challenge is ensuring that startups—not only multinationals—are integrated into these value chains. This may require new regulatory models, procurement frameworks, or shared-infrastructure platforms that reduce barriers for smaller firms.
A related issue is talent accessibility. For deep-tech ventures to scale, Singapore must remain a place where specialized scientific and engineering talent can enter quickly and affordably. Today, the cost and administrative complexity of bringing in such profiles—especially early-career researchers and engineers—can be prohibitive for startups, given rising EP salary thresholds and the administrative burden of COMPASS evaluations, which often disadvantage junior hires who do not yet meet experience or salary benchmarks. Easing this bottleneck, without compromising standards, would materially enhance Singapore’s attractiveness as a deep-tech hub.
Most crucially, Singapore must cultivate a leadership ethos within its innovation agencies that values contrarian ideas, tolerates uncertainty, and resists emulating foreign models. The world’s successful deep-tech ecosystems—from Boston’s biotech cluster to Israel’s defense-driven innovation and Denmark’s life-science specialization—did not emerge from copying others. They articulated contextually grounded identities. Singapore must decide what its own contribution to global deep tech will be: quantum governance, sustainability technologies for tropical megacities, advanced neurodiagnostics, next-generation manufacturing, or something yet undefined.
A system optimized for administrative excellence will produce competent incrementalism. A system that allows space for contrarian thinkers—scientists, founders, policymakers—will produce transformative breakthroughs.
Leadership beyond efficiency?
Singapore remains one of the world’s most capable innovation states. Its achievements in building a deep-tech ecosystem from almost nothing are remarkable. Yet success has created its own expectations and weaknesses. The global venture-capital winter did not cause Singapore’s challenges; it illuminated them.
For Singapore to thrive in the next era of deep-tech competition, it must resist treating innovation as an efficiency exercise. The deepest questions are not administrative but philosophical: What risks is Singapore willing to take? What form of national identity should its innovation system express? And what kind of contrarian leadership will champion ideas that defy the neat logic of spreadsheets and ROI models?
Deep tech rewards courage, patience, and clarity of purpose. Singapore has these qualities in latent form; the task now is to bring them to the center of its innovation strategy. The country must move beyond adaptation and articulate a model that is not only effective but original: a deep-tech identity shaped by Singapore’s own complexity and ambition. The opportunity is simple: to build a deep-tech identity only Singapore could create.
About the author
Pierrick Bouffaron is Managing Partner at Entropia Capital, where he focuses on building and backing frontier-tech ventures across the US, Europe, and Asia. He previously held leadership roles in banking, energy, infrastructure, and technology policy across three continents, and has conducted research at institutions including NUS, UC Berkeley, and Mines Paris. Pierrick holds an MS in mechanical engineering, an MS in applied mathematics, and a PhD in operations and innovation management.
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